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VOTERS' RIGHTS IN BOND ELECTIONS
AND THE HOME RULE POWERS
The home rule powers granted to chartered cities by the California Constitution1 have, since that document's ratification, been significantly diminished.2 As more governmental activities have become
matters of regional or statewide concern, the courts have concurrently
limited the exclusive home rule powers of cities to control such activities. Furthermore, as previously local concerns have become larger,
areawide interests, the distinction between municipal affairs and statewide concerns has lessened. In City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld
the California Supreme Court has taken a further step in the limitation
of municipal powers, with the consequent expansion of general statewide interests. The question remains, however, whether such expansion will provide a workable basis upon which municipalities can determine the scope of their activities.
In Von Raesfeld the court held the interest rate on revenue bonds,
approved by Santa Clara voters in order to finance a local sewer project,
could be increased pursuant to a newly adopted state statute without the
consent of the city voters. In so holding, the court considered two diverse areas of municipal corporations law: (1) the rights of voters in
municipal bond elections;4 and (2) the limitations on the home rule
powers of chartered cities.
Although voters have been granted the right to control certain indebtedness of their governments, 5 their power to control the terms and
conditions of their authorization has been uncertain.6 The leading case
of Peery v. City of Los Angeles7 characterized the relationship between
a municipal bond issuer and the electorate as analogous to a contract.8
Von Raesfeld, however, held the rights of voters were based solely
upon the constitutionally mandated elections of article XI, section 18 of
1. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
2. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51
Cal. 2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959) (telephone lines); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636,
192 P. 442 (1920) (traffic); see cases cited in note 68 infra.
3.

3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8 (1970).

4.

For a discussion of the rights of bondholders and property owners in mu-

nicipal bond elections see Comment, Alteration of Rights in California Public Securi-

ties, 53 CALi'. L. tRnv. 1081 (1965).
5. See CAL. CON ST. art. XVI, § 1; id., art. XIII, § 40.
6. See 53 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 128, 132 (1970).
7. 187 Cal. 753, 203 P. 992 (1922).
8. Id. at 767, 203 P. at 998.
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the California Constitution 9 rather than any metaphorical contract" alluded to in Peery. The provisions of Santa Clara's City Charter were
deemed pre-empted by the state statute which permitted the changing
of bond interest rates without the voters' consent. Thus, the court not
only gave a much needed delineation" to the status of the voter in authorizing a bonded indebtedness but also provided local governments
with an effective means of making revenue bonds salable.
With regard to the home rule powers of a chartered city, the court
12
determined the Santa Clara sewer project was not a municipal affair.
The project's bonds were thus outside the exclusive home rule powers
of Santa Clara and subject to state regulation. Apparently, the court
proposed a new basis for determining what activities were subject to
home rule since sewers have traditionally been considered a municipal
affair. " The project was found to be of broader statewide interest primarily because of its effect on a statewide concern.'" Although the result reached by the court was reasonable, since the financing of a badly
needed sewer system was accomplished, the holding fails to clarify the
scope of home rule powers. The guidelines supplied by prior case law
have been supplanted by new criteria whose dimensions have yet to be
shaped by the courts.
The Factual Setting
In 1968 the city of Santa Clara, pursuant to its charter,' 5 submitted
to the voters a proposition calling for the issuance and sale of revenue
9. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18, now id. art. XIII, § 40, provided in part: "No
county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the
income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the
qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose." However, in Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1970), vacated & remanded, 403 U.S. 915 (1971), the California Supreme Court
found this two-thirds vote requirement a denial of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
10. 3 Cal. 3d at 249, 474 P.2d at 982, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
11. For a discussion of the prior conflicting interpretations of this status see
notes 35-39 & accompanying text infra.
12. 3 Cal. 3d at 246-47, 474 P.2d at 979-80, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
13. Id. at 246, 474 P.2d at 979-80, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12; see note 62 & accompanying text infra.
14. Id. at 246-47, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
15. Section 1321(c) of the city charter, as quoted by the court, provides: "The
City Council may avail itself of any of the procedures now or hereafter authorized by
the general laws of the State of California for the issuance of revenue bonds or the
City Council may, by ordinance or resolution effective upon adoption set up and establish a procedure for the issuance of such revenue bonds, the calling and holding of
elections therefor, and all matters pertaining to the issuance and sale of such bonds;
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bonds' 6 to provide funds for the acquisition, construction, and financing of improvements to the city sanitary sewage system. The system
was to serve as part of a regional sewage control facility of several cities in the southern San Francisco Bay Area.' 7 According to the resolution, the rate of interest on the proposed bonds was not to exceed 6 percent per annum, payable semiannually. This resolution was approved
at a subsequent election.
Santa Clara, however, had difficulty selling the bonds at the prescribed rate because of the "unusually high interest rates which prevail[ed] in the municipal bond market."' 8 To facilitate the financing of
many public improvements, the state legislature enacted an urgency
measure' 9 which permitted local government agencies to increase interest rates on any unsold bonds to 7 percent. In pursuance thereto, the
city council of Santa Clara adopted a resolution increasing the interest
rate on the unsold bonds for the sewer project to 7 percent in order to
improve their salability. City Manager Von Raesfeld refused to issue
notices of sale of the revised bonds at a higher interest rate because:
(1) the previous election vested contractual rights between the city and
provided, however, that the issuance of said revenue bonds shall be submitted to the
electors at an election and the votes of a majority of all those voting on the proposition
shall be required to authorize the issuance of the bonds." Id. at 243 n.l., 474 P.2d at
977 n.1, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 9 n.1 (emphasis added).
16. "Revenue bonds are not general obligations of the municipality which are
payable from taxes, but are payable solely from the revenues of the utility or other undertaking." 15 E. McQumLiN, THE LAw OF MuNiciMAL CORPORTONS § 43.131, at 703

(3d ed. 1970). As such, they have been interpreted as not creating an indebtedness
or liability on the part of the municipal corporation, so as to require the two-thirds vote
of article XI, section 18. City of Oxnard v. Dale, 45 Cal. 2d 729, 737, 290 P.2d 859,
863 (1955); accord, City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald, 52 Cal. 2d 620, 624, 342 P.2d
898, 900 (1959). But cf. City of Los Angeles v. Layton, 269 Cal. App. 2d 567,
571-72, 75 Cal. Rptr. 143, 145-46 (1969), holding invalid a city ordinance which
granted local officials the authority to issue revenue bonds. The revenue bonds were
held applicable to a charter provision which refers to any bonded indebtedness.
17. The extent of the regional participation involved and the relation of the
cities in the project is unclear. A form of joint powers agreement among the municipalities is thus implied, but not stated explicitly.
18. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 600, § 16, at 1235. See also San Francisco Chronicle,
July 28, 1969, at 8, col. 3.
19. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53540 (West Supp. 1971), provides in part: "(c) The
term 'bonds' includes bonds, warrants, notes, or other evidence of indebtedness of a local
agency, zone or improvement district except those which under Section 18 of Article
XI or other provision of the Constitution of the State of California are required to be
authorized at an election." Id. § 53541 reads in part: "Any provision of law requiring an election to the contrary notwithstanding, the legislative body without a vote of
the electors may issue bonds of the local agency, zone or improvement district. ...
"Bonds issued pursuant to this section may bear interest at a rate or rates not to
exceed 7 percent per year."
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the electorate that could only be altered by a new election; and (2) the
city charter2" required that the bonds first be approved by a majority of
the qualified electors at a new election before they could be issued at
the higher rate. Subsequently, the city brought an action of mandamus to compel the issuance of the notice of sale of the bonds.2 '
Article XI, Section 18 and the Inapplicability of
Skinner and Peery
The primary reason for Von Raesfeld's refusal to post notices of
sale were two early and long-standing interpretations of the rights of
voters in bond elections pursuant to section 18 of article XI of the California Constitution.2 2 Adopted in 1879 at the constitutional convention, 23 section 18 prohibited municipal corporations from incurring a
debt in excess of the current fiscal year's revenue without a mandate
from two-thirds of the qualified voters. This provision emanated from
an attempt to limit excessive governmental indebtedness. 24 The need
for such an electoral check grew from the municipalities' past borrowing
abuses in becoming indebted far in excess of their ability to repay.2 5
Thus, the constitutional framers felt they could
trust the voters' judg26
ment to control local government expenditure.
Strict holdings for the rights of voters in two early cases were consonant with this reasoning of controlling governmental abuse of its
borrowing power. In Skinner v. City of Santa Rosa2 - a bond authorization proposal specifying that interest was to be paid annually was
submitted inter alia to the voters, even though such submission was not
required by statute. The city of Santa Rosa then attempted to make interest payments due semiannually, instead of annually, claiming that
20. See note 15 supra.
21. The writ was originally filed in the Court of Appeal, 1st Appellate District,
where it was denied without a written opinion. Petitioner then sought the same relief
in the California Supreme Court. The court probably accepted jurisdiction for two
reasons. Von Raesfeld would be the first court interpretation of Government Code
sections 53540-41 and there were two conflicting appellate court statements in this

area. See note 35 infra.
22.
23.

See note 9 supra.
3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1382-83 (1881).
24. A. VAN ALSTYNE, BACKGROUND STUDY RELATING TO ARTICLE XI: LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 356 (Cal. Const. Revision Comm'n 1966) [hereinafter cited as VAN
ALSTYNE].

25. See generally Beebe, Hodgman & Sutherland, Joint Powers Authority Revenue Bonds, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 19, 21-26 (1968) for examples of early California municipal bond abuses.
26. 3 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 1382 (1881).
27. 107 Cal. 464, 40 P. 742 (1895).
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since there was no statutory requirement for insertion of an interest payment schedule in the proposal, it was therefore not binding upon the
city. The court held the vote of the electorate authorizing the indebtedness included all the particulars in the original proposal as conditions
upon which the approval was granted.2 s Therefore, the interest rate
payment schedule was a part of the bond authorized by the voters and
could not be altered by the city except with voter approval.
In Peery v. City of Los Angeles 9 the voters had approved the issuance of general obligation bonds at a maximum annual interest rate of
4!/2 percent. Subsequently, the state legislature enacted a statute authorizing "[a] city.., to sell any unsold bonds .. .at a price netting
the purchaser not more than six percent per annum payable semiannually. ' 30 When the city attempted to sell the bonds at an interest rate in excess of 5 percent, petitioner Peery was granted an injunction restraining the city from issuing the revised bonds. The court
held that "through the exercise of the constitutional right of the electors
of [the] city in approving the creation of the bonded indebtedness" 3'
a status analogous to a contract was created between the city and the
voters. Furthermore, to permit any subsequent change in the express
conditions of the authorization without the voters' consent would "in
effect [have been] a fraud upon the electors." 2
Subsequent decisions had upheld the Peery ruling that the relationship of the voters to the bond issuer was analogous to a contractual
obligation." Yet, these decisions omitted Peery's reliance on the constitutional rights exercised in the voters' approval. The contractual
analogy was thus applied indiscriminantly to all voter authorizations,
regardless of any constitutional requirement for an election.3 4 However, since no California Supreme Court ruling had thus distinguished
Peery, Von Raesfeld's reliance on the contract theory for Santa Clara's
revenue bonds seemed reasonable.
The Peery rule had, however, been questioned in more recent court
28. Id. at 472, 40 P. at 745, where the court states: "[N]o one can say
that without these favorable conditions the result of the election would have authorized
the indebtedness to be incurred."
29. 187 Cal. 753, 203 P. 992 (1922).
30. Id. at 757, 203 P. at 993.
31. Id. at 767, 203 P. at 998.
32.

Id.

33. E.g., Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Filmer, 217 Cal. 754, 757, 21
P.2d 112, 113 (1933); Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Wright, 213 Cal.
335, 349, 2 P.2d 168, 173 (1931); see City of King City v. Thommarson, 8 Cal. App.
3d 651, 654, 87 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1970) (dictum); Robbins v. Sonoma County
Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 138 Cal. App. 2d 291, 299-300, 292 P.2d
52, 57-58 (1956).
34. See authorities cited note 33 supra.
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of appeal cases. 3 5 In State School Building Finance Committee v.
Betts3" the validity of school bonds was in issue." Here, the court in
dictum rejected the application of Peery by stating:
It is not necessary to draw contractual analogies. The logical
basis for invalidating such amendments is not that they violate a
metaphorical contract; rather, that they clash with the constitutional provision
38 which required popular approval of the bonds in
the first place.
Thus the Betts court replaced the Peery rule with a more rational one
which grounded the electorate's rights on the constitution, as opposed
to a nebulous analogy to contract principles.39
The court in Von Raesfeld cited Betts as stating the correct rule.4"
Thus, the court declined any contractual analogy to a vote where article XI, section 18 did not require an election. To have otherwise
extended the contractual analogy to revenue bonds would have perpetuated that original purpose of the rule which protected against governmental abuse with strict voter controls. 4 However, article XI, section 18 no longer served this function; rather it served
35. E.g., Eastern Municipal Water Dist. v. Scott, 1 Cal. App. 3d 129, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 510 (1969), where the court upheld the validity of CAL. WATER CODE § 71960
(West Supp. 1971) which had been amended by Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 600, § 15 at
1235. This newly amended section permitted a municipal water district to increase
interest rates on general obligation bonds to 7 percent without a subsequent election
to gain voter approval for the new interest rate. Because a water district is not
enumerated in the California Constitution, article XI, section 18, the court in Scott
found no constitutional requirement for a vote and thus authorized the increase in
interest rate without a subsequent election. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 135-36, 81 Cal. Rptr.
at 514-15.
But see City of King City v. Thommarson, 8 Cal. App. 3d 651, 87 Cal. Rptr. 757
(1970), where the court ruled that a city's general obligation bond issuance which was
authorized by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electorate could only be amended by a
like vote of the electorate in order to increase the interest rate on the bonds. With
regard to the Scott ruling, the court stated in dictum that "its assertion that Skinner
and Peery apply only constitutional limitations . . . would be meaningless when a city
is involved." Id. at 654, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 759. That is, because a city would be constitutionally bound by the two-thirds vote requirement, the strong statements of Skinner
and Peery, which precluded any bond issuance or change in interest rate without the
consent of the voters, would still be applicable, having never been limited or overruled.
36. 216 Cal. App. 2d 685, 31 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1963).
37. Changed conditions in the bond repayment were held within the voters'
approval since the phrase "as provided by law" was flexible enough to contemplate the
amendment to the law. Id. at 692, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
38. Id. at 693, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
39. In so defining the status of the voters, the court does not explicitly refute the
basis upon which Skinner v. City of Santa Rosa, 107 Cal. 464, 40 P. 742 (1895),
relied, i.e., that the conditions upon which the consent of the voters is obtained cannot
be altered.
However, it can probably be safely assumed that this ground comes
within the constitutional protection rule of Betts.
40. 3 Cal. 3d at 249, 474 P.2d at 982, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
41. See notes 24-26 supra.
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to safeguard the general funds and property of a municipality from
a situation whereby the holders of an issue of bonds could . . .
force an unconsented-to increase in the taxes of, or foreclose
on the general assets and property of the issuing public corpora42
tion to obtain payment of the principal or interest thereon.
Therefore, only in cases where increased interest rates of a bond issue
might cause an increase in taxes or a possible foreclosure was there a
need for the constitutional protection of the voters' rights.
Because the bonds authorized by the voters in Von Raesfeld were
revenue bonds, they could not create an indebtedness of the city within
the meaning of article XI, section 18 and could not become a lien
against the city's general assets or property. 43 Any subsequent default
on the bonds could only be charged against the special fund of the
revenue producing entity.44 Similarly, any increase in service charges
due to higher interest rates on the bonds would be apportioned according to the benefits received from that service. Therefore, the voters lost
no rights with respect to an interest rate increase in which they had
a truly vested or substantial concern.
At the same time, the effect of the ruling from the municipality's
viewpoint was salutory. The law in this area has been clarified so that
only in those instances in which the California Constitution required an
election would the voters' maintain the right to control the conditions
of their authorization. Also, the municipality would not be burdened
by the expense of the delayed funding of projects due to the wait for an.
election date. Finally, bonds subject to the limited control of the local
legislative body to increase the interest rates, could be made more salable without the chance of the voters defeating an approved project for
which some bonds had already been sold, at a later election.
Conflict Between The City Charter and the General Law
The passage of the urgency legislation by the state apparently gave
the Santa Clara City Council authority to increase the interest rate on
unissued bonds for the sewer project without infringing on the rights of
its voters. However, section 1321(c) of the city charter provided that
a majority of all those voting at an election "shall be required to authorize the issuance of the revenue bonds. ' 45 Since the only bonds to
have received the majority vote required for issuance were those outstanding bonds bearing a maximum interest rate of 6 percent per an42. City of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 131, 352 P.2d 170,
173-74, 5 Cal. Rptr. 10, 13-14 (1960).
43. See authorities cited note 16 supra.
44. City of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 131-32, 352 P.2d 170,
174, 5 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14 (1960).
45. See note 15 supra.
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num, any new issuance of the 7 percent bonds without the approval of a
majority of the voters would be in violation of the city charter.4 6 A conflict was thus created between the provision of the city charter and the
state legislation.
In cases of conflict between a local regulation and statewide legislation, the matter is generally resolved by application of the preemption
doctrine4 to determine whether the general state laws "occupy the
field to the exclusion of any further municipal regulation." 48 However, because this case involves a charter city, which by the California
Constitution is guaranteed exclusive jurisdiction over municipal affairs,4 9 the issues of conflict and pre-emption become relevant only when
the activity in question is determined not to be a municipal affair. 50
The threshold issue is therefore whether the project is within the exclusive municipal affairs powers granted to chartered cities by the home
rule amendments to the constitution.
Municipal Powers Under Home Rule

The home rule provisions of the California Constitution at the
time of Von Raesfeld were contained primarily in article XI, section 6,
which provided in part: 51
46. It was primarily the construction to be given this section of the city charter in
light of the Government Code provisions, that both the petitioner's and respondent's
briefs argued. Both parties considered the city charter to be applicable because the
sewer project for which the bonds were issued was a municipal affair within the control of the city under its charter. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, Brief for Respondent
at 5, 10, City of Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239, 474 P.2d 976, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 8 (1970).
47. See Feiler, Conflict Between State and Local Enactments-The Doctrine of
Implied Preemption, 2 URBAN LAW 398, 404 (1970): "Preemption occurs where
there is a conflict between the legislative intent to regulate an area and the very act of
local legislation in conflict with this legislative intent." See also Comment, The California City versus Preemption by Implication, 17 HASTINGs L.J. 603 (1966). In California, preemption by state law occurs when a municipal corporation enacts legislation
pursuant to powers granted under former article XI, section 11 (now section 7) of the
constitution.
48. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61-62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 468 (1969).
49. See notes 51-54 & accompanying text infra.
50. See Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276,
292 n.11, 384 P.2d 158, 168 n.ll, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 n.11 (1963) in which the
court states that "[tihe [preemption] doctrine is not applicable to the claim that the
state [flegislature is prohibited (by the home rule provisions of the other sections of
art. XI) from enacting legislation which will affect a chartered city. In [this]
case, the sole question is whether or not the subject matter of the attempted legislation is exclusively a municipal affair." (emphasis added).
51. Since June 2, 1970, article XI, section 6 has been repealed and replaced by
article XI, section 5 which provides in part: "(a) It shall be competent in any city
charter to provide that the city governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordi-
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Cities and towns. . . organized under charters framed and adopted
by authority of this Constitution are hereby empowered . . . to
make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal
affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in
their several charters, and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to and controlled by general laws (emphasis added).

This section and its amendments in 1896 and 1914 were enacted to "emancipate municipal governments from the authority and

control formerly exercised over them by the Legislature.152 A chartered city was thus given plenary power to regulate municipal affairs,53
and regulation of municipal affairs was deemed to supersede state law,
even in case of a conflict. 54 However, where the subject matter in question is determined to be of statewide concern, and there exists a conflict with the state legislation, the general state laws will prevail under
the pre-emption doctrine.55

The court in Von Raesfeld held the Santa

Clara sewer project was not a municipal affair. 56 Therefore, any bonds

nances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions
and limitations provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution
shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith." (emphasis added). See also CAL. CoNsT. art. XI,
§ 8(j) (repealed 1970) which provided in part that "It shall be competent in any
charter framed under the authority of this section to provide that the municipality
governed thereunder may make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in their
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws."
The substance of this section is now contained in article XI, section 5.
52. People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880). See, e.g., Cal. Stat. 1875, ch. 528,
§ 1, at 800, prohibiting cows, hogs, and goats from running at large in the town of
Washington in Yolo County and making it the duty of the constable to collect such
animals. See generally Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California, 30 CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 11-20 (1941) for a listing of other early state statutes.
53. Bellus v. City of Eureka, 69 Cal. 2d 336, 346, 444 P.2d 711, 717, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 141 (1968); City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal. 2d 595, 599,
212 P.2d 894, 896 (1949); In re Nowak, 184 Cal. 701, 704, 195 P. 402, 403 (1921);
cf. In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 128, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393,
398-99 (1964).
54. See, e.g., Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d 137, 140,
81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1969); Raisch v. Myers, 27 Cal. 2d 773, 778-79, 167 P.2d 198,
201 (1946); City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 393, 10 P.2d 745, 748
(1932); Cole v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 617, 622, 182 P. 436, 438 (1919).
55. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292,
384 P.2d 158, 168, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 (1963). In this regard, it should be made
clear that a municipality is free to legislate in an area of statewide concern and states
can legislate in areas deemed to be municipal affairs. Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d
366, 369-70, 125 P.2d 482, 484 (1942). The section 11 problem arises only when both
have legislated in the same area. A determination that the subject matter is a municipal
affair precludes the state from enforcing its legislation on the city; cf. Bishop v. City of
San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61-62, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1969).
56. 3 Cal. 3d at 247, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
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issued for the project were not solely the subject of municipal regulation.57 Thus, the city charter provision requiring voter approval for
an interest increase was pre-empted by the contrary statewide legislation.
This finding of a statewide concern raises the problem of how such a
statewide concern, as opposed to a municipal affair, was determined.
Statewide Concern v. Municipal Affair
The California Supreme Court has consistently refused to elucidate
the meaning of those "loose, indefinable, wild words 'municipal affairs'.158 Rather, it has left to the facts of each case,5 9 the determination of whether a given activity came within the municipal affairs
powers which the constitution guaranteed. This gives municipalities
the burden of ascertaining any guidelines6" upon which to prejudge
their own future activities; ever mindful that "[w]hat may at one time
have been a matter of local concern may at a later time become a matter
of state concern controlled by the general laws of the state." 61
The court in Von Raesfeld recognized that sewer projects have
traditionally been regarded as matters within the exclusive province of
municipal regulation.6 2 Moreover, they have been held a municipal affair of such magnitude that "the power of a city to provide sewage disposal services . . . is one of the few powers that a city may exercise outside of its territorial limits without express authorization." 6' 3 This ex57. Revenue bonds for a municipal purpose would themselves be municipal affairs. City of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, 54 Cal. 2d 126, 137, 352 P.2d 170, 177,
5 Cal. Rptr. 10, 17 (1960); City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 34 Cal. 2d 595, 599601, 212 P.2d 894, 896-97 (1949); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 521-22, 95 P.2d 138, 142 (1939); City of Santa Monica
v. Grubb, 245 Cal. App. 2d 718, 724, 54 Cal. Rptr. 210, 215 (1966).
58. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214, 74 P. 780, 784 (1903) (concurring
opinion).
59. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294,
384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963); Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal. 2d 140,
147, 82 P.2d 434, 438 (1938); see Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214, 74 P. 780, 784
(1903) (concurring opinion) which stated that "[t]his court has not undertaken, and
probably will not undertake, to give a general definition of the words [municipal affairs], so as to bring all future cases within the two categories of what is and what is
not a municipal affair."
60. See In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 127-28, 396 P.2d 809, 814, 41 Cal. Rptr.
393, 398 (1964).
61. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 51 Cal. 2d 766,
771, 336 P.2d 514, 517 (1959).
62. 3 Cal. 3d at 246, 474 P.2d at 979, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 11; accord, City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal. 2d 93, 99, 308 P.2d 1, 4 (1957); Loop Lumber Co. v. Van
Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 232, 159 P. 600, 602 (1916); Cramer v. City of San Diego,
164 Cal. App. 2d 168, 171, 330 P.2d 235, 238 (1958).
63. City of Ceres v. City of Modesto, 274 Cal. App. 2d 545, 553, 79 Cal. Rptr.
168, 172 (1969), citing Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d
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traterritorial power 64 has been recognized when a city has found it necessary or manifestly desirable to provide extraterritorial sewer services.6 5
The Santa Clara project apparently then did not become of statewide
concern solely because it may have extended beyond the boundaries of

the city limits. °6 Rather, something in addition to mere extraterritorial
presence was found relevant.
There have been instances in which the extraterritorial extension

of a municipal activity has changed it from a matter of local concern to
one of statewide interest. Where a city has been encompassed by a state
created district larger than the boundaries of the city, the control of the
67
district has been held beyond the municipal affairs powers of the city.
Similarly, what had previously been a municipal affair of the city prior

to such vertical encompassment is no longer such when the district,
which includes the city within its boundaries, has been delegated such

powers. 68 Whether the Santa Clara sewer project came within this latter formulation is unclear. The court in Von Raesfeld cites those cases
where an otherwise municipal affair is no longer such when a state
created district has supplanted the city's authority upon the inclusion of
the city within the district. 69 However, there is no mention in Von Raesfeld of the existence of such an entity. The "regional water pollution
713, 718, 329 P.2l 289, 291 (1958); Mulville v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734,
737, 192 P. 702, 703 (1920). But cf. Santa Barbara Agency v. All Persons, 47 Cal.
2d 699, 710, 306 P.2d 875, 882 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
64. Cf. CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 55000-04 (West 1966), which provides procedures
whereby a local agency may construct sewer lines in a district other than its own.
65. See Mulville v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 737, 192 P. 702, 703
(1920).
66. Cf. Ruane v. City of San Diego, 267 Cal. App. 2d 548, 73 Cal. Rptr. 316
(1968) (city bus transportation to suburbs); City of North Sacramento v. Citizens
Util. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961) (city condemnation of
water system outside its territorial limits); Durant v. City of Beverly Hills, 39 Cal.
App. 2d 133, 102 P.2d 759 (1940) (city may supply water to persons outside its limits).
But cf. Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 50 Cal. App. 2d 374, 122 P.2d 965 (1942) (a
municipal ordinance which has an adverse effect on nonresidents not upheld).
67. In re Madera Irrigation Dist., 92 Cal. 296, 28 P. 272 (1891).
68. See, e.g., Santa Barbara Agency v. All Persons, 47 Cal. 2d 699, 710, 306
P.2d 875, 882 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (holding the
Santa Barbara County Water Agency valid insofar as it did not contravene the municipal purpose clause of section 6 of article XI); City of Pasadena v. Chamberlain,
204 Cal. 653, 659-60, 269 P. 630, 633 (1928) (Metropolitan Water District Act held
constitutional in the combined operations of several municipalities); Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 160, 141 P. 815, 818 (1914) (held valid a sanitary district organized pursuant to state statute as not being a municipal affair); Wilson v. City
of San Bernardino, 186 Cal. App. 2d 603, 607-09, 9 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433-34 (1960)
(holding that formation of a water district was not a municipal affair); Gadd v. McGuire, 69 Cal. App. 347, 354-55, 231 P. 754, 757-58 (1924) (permitting the extramunicipal construction of sewers pursuant to a state act).
69. 3 Cal. 3d at 246-47, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
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control facility involving the efforts of several cities acting in common"" °
thus could only have been analogized to the earlier cases of vertical encompassment by a larger district. The holding in Von Raesfeld, therefore, seemed to turn not so much on either the extraterritorial nature of
the project, or on the intercity agreement, but rather on what appears to
be a new basis promulgated by the court.
Affecting a Statewide Concern
The primary basis upon which the court apparently relied is that
"Isluch projects also may affect matters which are acknowledged to be
of statewide concern."'" Although each of the three cases cited by the
court found their respective subject matter to be of statewide concern,
none went so far as to hold that an activity which "affects" a statewide
2
concern is itself a matter of statewide concern.1
The use of the verb "affect" in this regard may simply have been
a rewording of the proposition that activities of a "broader scope, which
can not be adequately handled by the municipal authorities of a single
town"7 3 are of statewide concern. In such a case, the local activity would
certainly affect the broader statewide concern. However, as previously
discussed," in such instances there has been in existence some different
state created entity larger than the city, which does not allow the activity to be entirely of local concern; whereas in Von Raesfeld there was
only a horizontal agreement between adjoining cities.
The argument can therefore be made that the court deemed the
word "affect" to mean that the activity itself will no longer be the determining factor in whether such activity is a municipal affair. Rather,
it is the effect of any activity upon a statewide concern which may remove such activity from the control of the municipality. 75 Such a test
markedly broadens the traditional concept of what is a statewide concern and what is a municipal affair. The old standard for determination was based upon the kind of activity in which the municipality was
engaged. The court by using the effect of an activity seemingly re70. Id. at 247, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
71. Id. at 246, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. 12 (emphasis added).
72. E.g., Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 67 Cal. 2d
408, 416-19, 432 P.2d 3, 8-9, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406-08 (1967) (protection of
navigable waters); Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 209, 282 P.2d 481,
487 (1955) (tidelands); Stanislaus Co. Dairymen's Protective Ass'n v. Stanislaus, 8
Cal. 2d 378, 383-84, 65 P.2d 1305, 1307 (1937) (public health).
73. Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152, 160, 141 P. 815, 818 (1914).
74. See notes 67-69 & accompanying text supra.
75. Cf. 3 Cal. 3d at 247, 474 P.2d at 980, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 12, in which the

court states that "the sewage treatment facilities will protect [affect?] not only the
health and safety of petitioner's inhabitants, but the health of all inhabitants of the
San Francisco Bay Area." This statement implies such a broadened construction.
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places this with the degree to which that activity "affects a statewide
concern". The word "affect" in this sense can have widely varying
constructions, and as a guide upon which municipalities must determine
the scope of their activities, leaves substantial uncertainty.
Problems in the Effect of an Otherwise Municipal Affair
The problem raised by this doctrine is the possibility that it may
abrogate the value of past judicial decisions as guidelines for determining the scope of municipal affairs. That is, mattters previously held
outside the legislative ambit of the state may now fall within state control. Two recent appellate court decisions upholding local ordinances
illustrate the problem.
In Stagg v. Municipal Court" a local ordinance prohibiting jet
aircraft from taking off during certain nighttime hours from a municipally owned airport 7 was upheld as a valid exercise of the city's home
rule police power. The case turned primarily 8 on the fact that state
law had not pre-empted the "right of flight" in the taking-off of jet aircraft. 79 However, if consideration is given to how such an ordinance
affects the travel of commercial or private jets, the argument can be made
that this ordinance was no longer solely of municipal concern and was
thus not a municipal affair.
As a second example of the incongruous holdings which can be
conceived, in People v. Mueller8" an appellate court upheld a local ordinance which prohibited the pollution of King Harbor with dead bait.8 l
The harbor was entirely within the city limits of Redondo Beach. Finding no pre-emption by the Fish and Game Code, the court stated that it
could find no authority holding that "the field of prevention of local water pollution has been preempted by state law."82 Furthermore,
76. 2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1969).
77. SANTA MONICA MUNICIPAL CODE § 10105(a) as cited in the opinion provides in part: "No pure jet aircraft shall take off from the airport between the hours
of 11:00 o'clock p.m. of one day and 7:00 a.m. the next day." Id. at 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. at 579.
78. Id. at 321, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 580. A secondary ground was state statutory
authorization for regulation of the use of the airport by municipal government. Id.
at 322-23, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
79. See CAL. PUB. UTL. CODE § 21403(a) (West 1965) which states in part
that: "Flight in aircraft over the land and waters of this State is lawful, unless . .
done at dangerously low altitudes.
80. 8 Cal. App. 3d 949, 88 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1970).
81. Id. at 953, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 159. Section 12-4.204(d) of the Redondo Beach
Municipal Code reads: "Disposal of bait: No person shall place or allow to be placed
any live or dead bait in the unconfined harbors of the Harbor except when such
bait is attached to a hook in the act of fishing."
82. Id. at 954, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
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the court stated: "Preemption by the state of an area of the law does
not preclude local legislation . . . which only incidentally affects the
preempted area. "83 Here again, assuming arguendo a broadly defined effect on the statewide concern of either: (1) the pollution in a
bay which may have streams emanating from the local area and leading
elsewhere outside of the immediate locality, or (2) the incidental effect on a state pre-empted area of the law, results divergent with the
Von Raesfeld decision may be reached. The point need not be belabored. Put simply, the doctrine of Von Raesfeld does not provide
workable guidelines for cities to use in framing the scope of regulations
and ordinances. The case-by-case guidelines of the past may be of little value under this new approach.
The Search for a Rational Basis to Determine a Statewide Interest
The result of the ruling in Von Raesfeld was an attempt by the
court to reach an equitable solution. However, the means of achieving
this end discarded previously established criteria used by cities to determine the limits of their municipal affairs. Only a year prior to Von
Raesfeld the California Supreme Court in Bishop v. City of San Joses4
had sought to clarify the problem of defining a statewide concern.
In Bishop an assignee of certain union electricians had sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the city had paid the workers
less than the state wage law required.8 5 The court, in holding for the
city, found that the legislature did not intend the minimum wage law to
apply to all city employees but only to those working on public contracts. In so holding the court stated:
[T]he fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to
deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs . . .
stated otherwise, the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an
affair into a matter of statewide concern. 6
By so limiting the ability of the legislature to determine the issue
of pre-emption the court explicitly overruled prior language to the
contrary. 7 Cases had previously relied upon the legislative purpose in
enacting a statute to resolve the municipal-statewide conflict; 8 and even
gone so far as to permit the legislature to declare a matter beyond the
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
294, 384

Id. at 954, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (emphasis added).
1 Cal. 3d 56, 460 P.2d 137, 81 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1969).
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1770-74 (West 1971).
1 Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
Id.
E.g., Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276,
P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
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exclusive legislative province of the cities.89 The gist of the court's
statement in Bishop is to once again limit the power of the legislature
to determine those affairs upon which it will exclusively oversee, thereby
granting to the municipalities a greater share in the governmental functions.00 In this regard, Bishop is consistent with the purpose of the
home rule amendments which emancipated local government from the
state legislature's control. 91
However, while the court may have granted at least the possibility
of more municipal power, by making the determination solely a judicially imposed one, the court may also have been further denying to the
municipalities a basis upon which to decide whether or not they should
make use of such broadened powers. The prior approach (now overruled by Bishop)was that in
cases of conflict and pre-emption, the inquiry ends once a statewide concern is found, and there is no need to weigh the state92 and
municipal concerns or to determine which should predominate.
This standard clearly based the powers over municipal affairs upon a
prior determination of a statewide concern. Furthermore, such a statewide concern could be found by the state legislature's determination of
such in enacting the law. The legislative determination thus acted as
a limiting factor for further municipal regulation and drew guidelines
for such municipal activity. The Bishop proposal of a de novo finding
of a statewide concern versus a municipal affair, by a weighing and
balancing of the respective state and local interests in each case, unfortunately may provide no more basis of prediction as to when a municipality may act in a given area than does the Von Raesfeld criteria.
In his dissent to the Bishop holding, Justice Peters objected to the
majority approach based upon the "predominance or superiority as between the general state laws on the one hand and the local regulations
on the other,"9 " because such an approach misconstrued the essentially
89. E.g., City of Redwood City v. Moore, 231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 580-81, 42

Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1965).
90. See generally Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and The Judiciary, 48 J. URBAN L. 335 (1971), for an analysis and discussion of local government
perspectives on the judiciary's and state legislature's roles in home rule.
91. But cf. 1 Cal. 3d at 63, 460 P.2d at 141, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 469 where the court
states that: "[in exercising the judicial function of deciding whether a matter is a
municipal affair or of statewide concern, the courts will of course give great weight to
the purpose of the Legislature in enacting general laws which disclose an intent to
preempt the field to the exclusion of local regulation... and it may well occur that
in some cases the factors which influenced the Legislature to adopt the general laws
may likewise lead the courts to the conclusion that the matter is of statewide rather
than merely local concern."
92. Id. at 66, 460 P.2d at 144, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472 (dissenting opinion).
93. Id.
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overlapping nature of municipal affairs and state concerns. As did the
affect upon a statewide concern enunciated in Von Raesfeld, so did the
statements in Bishop attempt to distinguish those areas of local versus
those of statewide concern. Yet, in both cases the standard proposed by
the court has tended to obfuscate instead of clarify any lines of demarcation between a statewide concern and a municipal affair.
In Von Raesfeld the degree of an activity's "affect on a statewide
concern" could remove that activity from the scope of municipal powers. Similarly, in Bishop the sole determination of a statewide concern
versus a municipal affair was to be based upon court findings of such,
and thus may have denied any future prediction. As the functions of
both state and local government expand, and the interrelation of governmental units increase, those aspects of governmental regulation
which relate solely to the interests of a single municipality will be rare.
Yet, because of the constitutionally created statewide concern-municipal affairs dichotomy, the courts will be forced to recognize such a distinction in law, although none may exist in reality. 4 Thus, the lack of
clarity between the two spheres is not due to court interpretation. Rather, it is an inevitable consequence of a
supposed distinction [which] "has defied reasonably predictable
application because of its lack of a firm rational core," and
has thus "served to shift largely political questions to the judicial
forum for decision."
Experience in California . . . has amply demonstrated that
functions of government are not logically subject to assignment to
the mutually exclusive categories implied by the phrase, "municipal
affairs".95

As an end result, alleviation of the confusion in the statewide concern-municipal affairs dichotomy can probably only be accomplished
by further constitutional revision. 96 However, as a step toward a more
immediate clarification, the court should reinstate that standard which
94. Cf. id. at 67-68, 460 P.2d at 144-45, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73, in which
Justice Peters states: "The rigid approach suggested by the majority, that matters are
either a municipal affair or of state concern, ignores the basic realities of most situations." There are four logical interrelationships between local regulations: (1) A
state law with no intrusion on municipal affairs, see Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852,
306 P.2d 789 (1957); (2) a municipal regulation and a state statute covering the same
subject matter, see In re Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 396 P.2d 809, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1964); (3) a municipal ordinance which partially imposes on matters of general
statewide concern, see Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal.
2d 276, 384 P.2d 158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963); (4) a municipal law which deals
exclusively with a municipal affair, see City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384,
10 P.2d 745 (1932).
95. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 24, at 251.
96. See generally id. at 252-59 for a discussion of the possible alternative
constitutional approaches.
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allowed for a legislative determination of a statewide concern.9 7 This
would foster predictability of the areas over which the state shall reign
supreme. Although such a standard might limit municipal initiative,
the court could act to assure that such legislative classifications of state
versus municipal affair are not arbitrary. In this regard, the court's
role, instead of its present policy making one in actually determining the
state and local interests, would shift to a more judicial one of finding
arbitrary aggrandizement by the legislature.98
Conclusion
The court's ruling in Von Raesfeld was somewhat of a two-edged
sword as far as the interests of municipal governments are concerned.
It allowed municipalities the right to increase interest rates on revenue
bonds for much needed municipal improvements without the expense
and delay of subsequent elections. However, in order to do so, the
court had to find the activity to no longer be a municipal affair.
With regard to the question of interest rates, the court has clarified
any prior confusion in this area. Voters are now to be granted protections against legislative change of the voter approved authorization for
bond issuance only where the election was constitutionally mandated.
Thus, in situations such as that present in Von Raesfeld, where revenue
bonds which could not become an indebtedness of the municipality
are issued, the legislative body may increase interest rates in order to
make those bonds more salable.
However, the basis upon which the court found the Santa Clara
sewer project to no longer be a municipal affair; i.e., that it affected a
statewide concern, will have to await future judicial rulings to determine if in fact the court has added even further flexibility to the already vague weighing test in Bishop. In this regard, Von Raesfeld
should at least be limited to its facts. The effect on a statewide concern is so broad as to prohibit determinations of what activities a municipality may legitimately engage in. Absent constitutional revision, the
standard proposed by Justice Peters in his dissent to the Bishop holding,
would serve to clarify those areas of statewide concern. This would
permit a legislative determination of what constitutes a statewide con97.

Cf., e.g., City of Redwood City v. Moore, 231 Cal. App. 2d 563, 580-81, 42

Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1965), which permitted a legislative determination of a reclamation district as a municipal affair.
98.

See VAN ALsnmE, supra note 24, at 252 where it is asked in light of current

judicial practices "whether lawyers concentrating their powers of analysis and advocacy upon the relatively narrow issues of a particular litigation are likely to expose
adequately to the court's attention the full sweep of policy considerations relevant to
the wisest allocation of legislative authority."
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cern without an expensive and time consuming judicial ruling in each
case. Charter cities could then act with more confidence in their authority under home rule, knowing at least generally what does and what
does not constitute a municipal affair.
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